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COURT OF APPEALS, 1955 TERM
evidence as a matter of law22 or when by no rational process could a-jury come
to a contrary finding.23 But, as long as there is a question of fact, it is for the
jury and not for the court.24 In the latter instance, a court is restricted to granting
a new trial if the jury's findings are against the weight of evidence but it may*
not dismiss the complaint.2 5 In non-jury trial cases, the Appellate Division may
not dismiss the complaint because the trial court's findings are against the weight
of evidence but it may reverse the judgment by making new findings of fact
supporting that judgment.
2 6
In determining whether sufficient evidence has been introduced to raise a
question of fact for the jury, the court will draw every reasonable inference from
the evidence in the aspect most favorable to uphold the jury's findings on the
issue.
2 7
In the instant case, the court held that evidence which tended to show that
the plaintiff had made a gift and not a loan to the defendant's wife was sufficient
to establish a prima facie case on the defendant's counterclaim enabling the jury
by a rational process to find that the money given to the defendant's wife was
in fact a gift and not a loan. The Court's determination appears to be entirely
correct in view of the fact that rescission may be had if there is a misrepresenta-
tion of a material fact although not amounting to fraud.
2 8
Judgment Absolute Sfipulations
In Gilligan v. Tishman Realty & Constr&Ction Co.,29 the non-stockholder
tenants of a co-operative apartment building brought an action against the defend-
ant, Realty, and the stockholders of the co-operative apartment building estab-
lished by Realty. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's dismissal in
favor of the defendants and ordered a new trial.30 Some of the stockholders of the
22. It re Case, 214 N. Y. 199, 108 N. E. 408 (1915); Blunt v. Fresh GCrown
Preserves Corp., 292 N. Y. 241, 54 N. E. 2d 809 (1944).
23. Stein v. Palisi, 308 N. Y. 293. 125 N. E. 2d 575 (1955), 5 BUFFALO L.
REV. 222 (1956).
24. McDonald v. Metropolitan Street By., 167 N. Y. 66, 60 N. E. 282 (1901).
25. Caldwefl v. Nico7son, 235 N. Y. 209, 139 N. E. 243 (1923).
26. N. Y. CONST. art. VI §8, N. Y. Civ. PRAC. Acr §584, . . . appellate court
may reverse judgment . . . appealed from . . . and render final judgment . . .
except where it may be necessary . . . to grant a new trial . . . ; Caldwefl V.
Nicolson, sutpra, note 25.
27. Faber v. City of New York, 213 N. Y. 411, 107 N. E. 756 (1915); Osipoff
v. City of New York, 286 N. Y. 422, 36 N. E. 2d 646 (1941); Sagorscy v. Maylon,
307 N. Y. 584, 123 N. E. 2d 79 (1954), 5 BUFFALO L. REv..63 (1955).
28. Bloomquist v. Snow, 222 N. Y. 375, 118 N. E. 855 (1918).
29. 1 N. Y. 2d 121, 134 N. E. 2d 100 (1956).
30. 283 App. Div. 157, 126 N. Y. S. 2d 813 (1st Dep't 1953),
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co-operative appealed to the Court of Appeals on stipulation for judgment
absolute,3 ' where decision was rendered against them.32 Before a new trial was
commenced against the non-appealing defendants, plaintiffs served a supplemental
complaint demanding that the prior judgment against the appealing defendants
be held binding against the non-appealing defendants because the latter had
decided who would appeal, had decided what stipulations were to be presented,
had paid costs and expenses, and had selected counsel, thus, in effect, controlling
litigation. The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division,3 3 dismis.ed
the supplemental complaint.
Williams v. Western Union Co.,34 relied on by the Court, held that if some
of the defendants appealed on stipulation for judgment absolute, the other defend-
ants would not be bound if they were not jointly interested in the defense. The
facts of the Williams case differ from this case in that the appealing defendant
there was the major party in interest, and the non-appealing defendants did not
participate in the defense on the appeal for stipulation on judgment absolute. Nor
was there any question of lack of good faith as there is in the present case. In
order to rely on this decision, the Court obviously not only found that there was
no jointness of interest between the appealing and the non-appealing defendants,
but that mere participation in the litigation on appeal could not bind the non-
appealing defendants to the judgment on appeal.
It is recognized that the general rules governing judgments are applicable to
judgments rendered on stipulation.3 5 The Court's decision was probably influenced
by the authority, though not stating it, that participation in the defense because
of general or personal interest in the result of the litigation does not make one
privy to the judgment.30 Moreover, the Court explicitly felt bound by the judg-
ment in Fish v. Vanderlip,3 7 where it was decided that mere indentical interest
and participation in the outcome of a litigation do not constitute joint interest.
But that case involved a contract of insurance where, as the Court there stated,
the rights and obligations of every one of the associates was wholly separate.38
31. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §588(3); Appeal to the Court of Appeals as of
right lies . . . from an order of the Appellate Division granting a new trial ...
where appellant stipulates that upon amflrmance, judgment . . . absolute shall
be rendered against him, and upon such appeal, the Cdurt of Appeals shall
affirm and render judgment . . . absolute against the appellant unless It
determines that the Appellate Division erred as a matter of law in granting
the new trial ....
32. 306 N. Y. 974, 120 N. E. 2d 230 (1954), modified on rehearing, 307 N. Y.
698, 120 N. E. 2d 863 (1954).
33. 286 App. Div. 812 142 N. Y. S. 2d 206 (1st Dep't 1955).
34. 93 N. Y. 162, 9 Abb. N. Cas. 437 (1883).
35. Canfield v. Elmer E. Harris & Co., 252 N. Y. 502, 107 N. E. 121 (1930).
36. Old Dominion Copper M & S Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N. E.
193 (1909); appliying New York law.
37. 218 N. Y. 29, 112 N. E. 425 (1916).
38. See note 37 supra at 39, 112 N. E. at 428.
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The word "identical" is defined as "exactly the same' for all practical put-
p6ses."39 Thus an identical interest can be said to be an interest exactly the same
as another interest for all practical purposes. It must be admitted that identical
interest alone will not bind the non-appealing defendant to the previous judgment
merely because he participated in the defense.40 This is true even if he had an
identical interest with an interest previously litigated since his interest may not
have been set forth or defended so as to come within his constitutional guarantee
of due process of law.41 But the writer believes that the non-appealing defendants'
right to their day in court can be waived by certain conduct on their part. There is
authority to the effect that if one prosecutes a suit to protect his. own right or
assists in prosecution of an action in aid of some interest of his own and
controls that action, although the suit is brought in name of another, he is bound
by the judgment.42 It appears that a question of fact arose whether the non-
appealing defendants participated to the extent that they might be bound by the
judgment on stipulation for judgment absolute. It is submitted that in view of the
question of fact, the majority, while applying the statute literally, failed to con-
strue the statute liberally, and was in error in holding, as a matter of law, that no
question of fact existed.
Mufualify of Esfoppel
Where the liability of a defendant is based in part upon the act of a third
party, it does not strike unfairly that a plaintiff, who has failed in a prior action
against that third party, should be prevented by res judicata from raising again
the identical issues decided in the prior suit.43 This indeed would seem to be most
in accordance with the underlying policy of res judicata, i.e., interest repi~blicae ut
sit fizis" litium.44 Yet such a result must be reached with some difficulty by the
courts because of a verbal stumbling block. As has been said, "The repetition of a
catchword can hold analysis in fetters for fifty years or more."45 The catchword
here is "mutuality."
Under the doctrine of "mutuality of estopper' a.party is precluded from
asserting a judgment in estoppel unless he would also be estopped had the same
judgment gone the other way; or, in other terms, the judgment must be equally
conclusive on both parties.46 Most reasons advanced for the rule, such as fairness,47
39. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951); Cain v. Moore, 74 Fla. 77, 76
So. 337 (1917).
40. See note 37 supra.
41. U. S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, §1; N. Y. CONsT. art I, §6.
42. Flynn v. Colonial Discount Co., 149 Misc. 607, 269 N. Y. S. '2d 893 (City
Ct. 1933); of. Henderson v. Henderson, 247 N. Y. 428, 160 N. E. 775 (1928).
43. Cf. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS§99 (1942).
44. Good Health Products v. Emerj, 275 N. Y. 14, 9 N. E. 2d 758 (1937);
45. Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 HARv. L. REV. 682 (1931),.
46. Nelson . Brown, 144 N. Y. 384, 39 N. E. 355 (1595),
47. 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS §429 (5th ed. 1925).
